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Abstract Assuming stochastic quotas for a fish stock that
is shared between two nations, we find the optimal fleet size for
one of them by maximizing expected profit under the assumption
that national quotas can be traded and that stable national quotas
is a political goal. As an example we use the Norwegian purse
seiner fleet and the summer capelin fishery in the Barents Sea.
Introduction
There exists a substantial literature on questions concerning quotas
in fisheries, most of which is based on deterministic models. But
as pointed out by many authors [see, e.g., Sissenwine (1984)], the
environment of fisheries is heavily influenced by uncertainties, in
particular, uncertainties related to recruitment and thereby quotas.
Several questions concerning quotas can be posed. We mention
how to settle the total quota if the resource is managed by only
one country (Clark, 1980; Spulber, 1982) and if it is managed by
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several countries (Munro, 1979). It is also important to know how
to distribute the total quota among the participating vessels and
enforce the regulations (Andersen and Sutinen, 1983; Clark, 1980),
and how to split the total quota among countries if the stock is a
shared resource.
Gulland (1980) describes the problems facing countries that must
manage stocks of fish that cross the boundaries between them. This
is a verbal description. Several authors have also modeled problems
connected to shared resources. We have already mentioned Munro
(1979), who considers the optimal management ofa transboundary
resource where the two participating countries cooperate. Levhari
and Mirman (1980), on the other hand, investigate the case of non-
cooperative management. Hannesson (1984) shows how the catch
capacities become too large if two countries, having identical fish
stocks except for the probability distribution of their abundances,
do not cooperate. Beddington and Clark (1984) treat the question
of allowing foreign fleets to take part in the fishing of a stock that
is managed by only one country, that is, whether it can be beneficial
to a country to let other nations fish on a stock that is solely its
own. These two last papers both assume stochastic recruitment.
Consider a shared resource where questions about the total
quota and the division of it among the countries are settled. Our
question is the following: Provided that a political goal for one of
the participating countries (country A) is to keep the (stochastic)
quotas stable by selling and buying quotas, and that the other
country (country B) under certain conditions is willing to take part
in such a trade, what is the optimal fleet size for country A, given
different trading prices? We shall look upon the fishery as if it were
run by one firm (the state). We find such an approach appropriate
from the society's point of view; see also Flam and Storoy (1982).
Questions concerning the optimal fleet size have also been ad-
dressed by others [see, e.g., Clark and Kirkwood (1979)]. They
do not consider shared resources and they assume a fixed stock-
independent recruitment. As they suggest in their paper, we have
replaced this by a stochastic recruitment.
Which prices are actually used will be a result of negotiations.
Our goal here is not to predict the outcome of such negotiations,
but to show the optimal solution for different trading prices. TheseOptimal Fleet Size When Quotas Can Be Traded 317
optimal solutions are useful from two viewpoints. First, if country
A and country B manage to agree on trading prices, such that
country A always can sell or buy as much as it wishes at those
prices, the solutions presented in this paper show what country A's
optimal fleet will look like as a result of the negotiations.
It is, however, probably rather unrealistic to assume that such a
treaty can be agreed upon. It is perhaps more reasonable to assume
that the negotiations will not only result in trading prices, but also
a quota R which is country A's stable quota. Hence if R is the
quota allotted to country A in a specific year, it will sell /? - R if
/? > R and buy R - « if R > /? at the agreed prices. In this case
the model is a useful input to the negotiations, since it shows coun-
try A what is optimal from its viewpoint. Note that none of the
situations we have described above imply that country A will wish
R as large as possible. There is an optimal value for R. Above this
value, the country will start losing money.
If country B accepts the treaty, it acts as a kind of insurance
company for country A. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
only trading prices that result in a net average (or expected) gain
for country B are interesting. Typically, country B will be much
larger than country A, so that its economy more easily absorbs
variation in the activity level of its fishing fleet.
Our objective is to maximize expected profit for country A given
the above-mentioned goal. In the long run the question of maxi-
mized expected profit is a question of resource management and
the structure of the fleet and the processing industry. We shall
assume that the processing industry is given and that the resource
is properly managed (and therefore that the total quota has a stable
distribution), such that maximizing expected profit is equivalent to
finding the optimal fleet structure.
The assumption that the processing industry is given is clearly
rather restrictive in the general case. We have chosen this approach,
however, because we have found earlier [see Wallace (1982)] that
the processing industry in the Norwegian industrial fisheries is
much closer to its optimal size than the fleet is, and we wanted to
highlight the situation in the fleet for these fisheries. Therefore, at
this point, the model formulation depends on the application it is
intended for. Also, for political reasons, closing plants is much more318 Stein W. Wallace and Karl Brekke
difficult than taking vessels out of the fisheries. The question to
answer is therefore: For diflerent trading prices, what is the optimal
fleet, and in these cases, how much will country A catch?
The Capelin Fisheries and the Purse Seiner Fleet
The quotas allotted to the Norwegian purse seiner fleet vary con-
siderably from one year to the next. This variation results in dif-
ficulties when the structure of the fleet is to be planned. Flam and
Stor0y (1982) have shown a method to settle the fleet size when
the quotas are assumed deterministic. Assuming that the quotas
are stochastic but that they have a stable distribution, Wallace and
Flam (1982) have shown how the optimal fleet size can be found
when we take into consideration that a given fleet will behave dif-
ferently with difl'erent quotas. The latter approach is based on a
formulation of a nonlinear two-stage stochastic optimization prob-
lem with recourse, where the long-run (first stage) decision is the
size of the fleet and the short-run (second stage) decision is how to
choose speed to catch a given quota with a given fleet. For a review
of two-stage stochastic optimization problems, see Wets (1983).
The Norwegian purse seiner fleet takes part in several fisheries
in the North Sea and the Barents Sea. The two major fisheries are
the summer capelin fishery and the winter capelin fishery. The total
catch of capelin in 1982 was 16.7 million hectoliters, out of which
most ofthe 67% allotted to the Norwegians was caught by the purse
seiners. The remaining 33% was caught by vessels from the USSR.
The catch in 1982 was below average. In these fisheries the catch
is always equal to the quota.
The capelin {Mallotus villosus) is a small pelagic fish belonging
to the family Osmeridae. The spawning stock consists of 3- and
4-year-old fish, and the fish dies after spawning. Because of the
short life of the capelin, it is not important to distinguish among
the diflerent year classes. It is therefore allowable to talk about
stochastic quotas instead of stochastic recruitment as we do in this
article. The fishing pattern is of no importance. The only problem
for the managers of the fish stock is therefore to make sure that
the escapement is of a reasonable size. So far this has been suc-
cessful. For more information about the capeHn, see Jangaard
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Clearly, aspects of the fishery other than the quota are also sto-
chastic, such as the position of the fishing ground and the size of
each catch. We have chosen to concentrate on the quota, however,
since we believe that this is the major uncertainty.
Although the amount of fish caught is approximately the same
in the two capelin fisheries, the summer capelin fishery requires
many more vessels than does the winter capelin fishery. The reason
is that whereas the winter capelin fishery takes place along the coast
of northern Norway, the summer capelin fishery takes place off the
coast of Spitzbergen (Svalbard), far north in the Barents Sea. The
need for transportation is therefore very large. Also, preservation
of the capelin is more difficult in the light summer months, far north
of the Arctic Circle.
The main problem of the Norwegian purse seiner fleet, as we see
it, is its enormous overcapacity. The fleet consists of approximately
160 vessels with cargo capacities between 2000 and 12,000 hecto-
liters. We show in this paper [see also Flam (1981); Flam and Stor0y
(1982); and Wallace and Flam (1982)] that a reduction to between
40 and 50 large vessels would be more appropriate. Such a fleet
would be very profitable.
There are two main problems connected to the overcapacity of
the fleet. First, it represents an enormous waste of capital. The fixed
costs of a large vessel is about 4.9 million Norwegian kroner per
year (between 0.6 and 0.7 million U.S. dollars). To calculate the
fixed costs we have used 7% rate of return on capital and numbers
from the official Norwegian fisheries statistics, see Budsjettnemda
(1983).
The second problem, however, is also very important. It is con-
nected to the fact that too many vessels take part in the fishery
simultaneously. Therefore, large queues occur at the fishmeal plants
and some vessels have to go all the way to southern Norway to
deliver the cargo. Also, the time available is not fully utilized, as
many vessels catch their individual quotas very early in the season.
Both the queues and the long trips could be avoided with a smaller
fleet, since it would lengthen the fishery in time and avoid the peak
in the first weeks of the fishery. The economic gain of such an ex-
tension is substantial.
To understand that queues and long trips can be avoided by
decreasing the number of vessels, it is important to remember the320 Stein W. Wallace and Karl Brekke
geography of the capelin fisheries. The fisheries take place north of
the Norwegian mainland, and the plants are spread southward
along the coast in an almost straight line. Furthermore, there are
several plants in northern Norway, very few in the middle part,
and many in the southern part. The extra costs of a trip to southern
Norway in the first weeks of the fishery cannot be offset by short
trips later in the season. Therefore, it is important to keep the
capelin in the northern part of the country. It should be more ob-
vious that the queues decrease when the number of vessels fishing
simultaneously decreases.
Further background information on the fisheries in which the
Norwegian purse seiner fleet takes part can be found in Flam (1981).
As mentioned above, the fishery that is most intensive is the summer
capelin fishery, so we shall concentrate on that fishery. The reason
is that the optimal fleet is found by checking for which fleet size
marginal costs equals marginal income. Therefore, the most inten-
sive fishery will be of greatest importance, since that is the fishery
where the marginal vessel is mostly needed and therefore the fishery
where it creates most of its income. Hence we reformulate our prob-
lem a Httle. Earlier we said that a goal of country A (in this case,
Norway) was to keep the quotas stable. We now only require the
quota in the summer capelin fishery to be stable.
The capelin stock in the Barents Sea is, as mentioned, a resource
shared between Norway and the USSR. Therefore, this is a stock
for which our formulation can be used. If the stock had been purely
Norwegian, we could of course sell quotas but not buy. As of today,
no trading in quotas is taking place.
The Model
In this section we give the model for the problem presented in
the preceding sections. The model is a linear stochastic optimization
model with simple recourse [see Wets (1975)].
The main idea behind a stochastic program with simple recourse
is as follows. The decision maker is confronted with one long-run
decision, uncertainty, and several short-run decisions. In our prob-
lem the long-run decision is the fleet structure, the uncertainty is
related to the quota, and the short-run decisions are how much to
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known (i.e., when the uncertainty is revealed to the decision maker).
The trading is done in order to keep the fieet busy (i.e., in order to
get the national quota equal to the capacity of the fieet). These two
types of decision are of course not independent. Since we assume
that a political goal is to keep national quotas stable (and have a
fieet with capacity equal to this quota), it should be clear that the
larger the fieet, the more probable it is that we have to buy quotas.
Assume that we have a set of plants, indexed by /, and a set of
vessel groups, indexed by v. The aim is to maximize total expected
profit with respect to some constraints. The total expected profit
is equal to the net value of the fish minus the variable and fixed
costs of the vessels and finally, minus the expected value of the fish
bought in order to keep the quota stable. (Clearly, if we on average
sell fish, we have to add the expected value of fish sold instead.)
Let i?i, i = 1,. .., n, be the possible values for the quota R and let
Pi be the probability that R = R^. The total expected profit 9 is
then given by
e = ZI {g.p - c,f)x,, - X F.Z, - Q{x) (1)
V f V
where






g^: Average catch per trip for a vessel in group v. This number
is based on empirical studies and it equals approximately
70% of the cargo capacity.
P: Net value of 1 hectoliter (hi) capelin.
c^/. Cost of one trip from fishing ground to plant / and back,
including all variable costs for a vessel in group v.
F^: Fixed costs for a vessel in group i; that must be covered
from this fishery. The fixed costs include a return on capital
plus maintenence and depreciation.322 " Stein W. Wallace and Karl Brekke
q'^: Selling price for 1 hi of capelin in the sea.
q~: Buying price for the same.
R{. Outcome for stochastic quota R.
Pi. Probability that R = Ri.
and the variables are:
X,,/. Total number of times vessels in group v deliver cargo at
plant /.
Z^: Number of vessels in group v.
The variables X^f and Z^ are the so-called first-stage variables.
They therefore represent the policy decision we want to make. In
addition, we have the second-stage variables y'^ and y~, which for
a given X and R^ show how much we sell or buy, respectively, in
order to keep the national quota stable.
Note that it is trivial to solve Equation (3), which represents the
recourse action. It shows how we in a given year have to buy quota
(j;~) if the quota allotted to us (i?,) is less than what we had
planned to catch (^^ X^^g^ and how we wish to sell (y"*") if our
quota is larger than what we had planned for. If we then take the
expectation of (3) for a given X, we get the expected value of traded
quotas Q(X). We see from Equation (1) that we must measure these
indirect (or second-stage) costs against the direct (or first-stage)
costs and the income.
Hence the goal in a stochastic optimization problem with re-
course is to find the first-stage variables (in our case, X^f and ZJ.
The second-stage variables {y'^ and y~) are not a part of the solu-
tion. In fact, there are as many j;"^ and y~ variables as there are
possible outcomes for R.
Our constraints are
• Plant / must not be overemployed.
Y^g^X^f^ Capf for all/ (4)
V
where Cap^ is the production capacity of plant / during the
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• The vessels must not be overemployed.
X .f ^ Z,T for all v (5)
where t^f is the time needed to catch the fish, deliver it at plant
/, and return to the fishing ground for a vessel in group v, and
T is the total length of the fishing season.
• Do not use more vessels than are available.
(6)
where Max^ is the total number of vessels available in group v.
Constraint (6) is used since we are considering an existing fleet.
Thus we do not allow an increase in the number of vessels of a
certain type even if the total number is decreased. If we had con-
sidered building a totally new fieet, constraint (6) would not have
been used.
As explained above, this is again a two-stage stochastic optimi-
zation problem with simple recourse. Equations (1) to (6) are in
standard format for such problems. They can be solved either itera-
tively using a variant of Benders' decomposition developed by Van
Slyke and Wets (1969) or as large linear programs as explained by
Wets (1975). We have solved ours as a large linear program.
To highlight the two-stage nature of these problems, let us re-
formulate Equations (1) to (6). The goal is to maximize 9, where
e = 11 {9.P - c,f)X^f - X F^Z^ + X (q^yr - q-yDVi
V f V
subject to
y^ - yr = R, - YZ ^vfOv i=l,...,n
and Equations (4) to (6). This should clarify that Equations (1) to
(6) comprise simply a large linear program, and that there are
as many y'^ and y~ variables as there are possible values for the
quota R.324 Stein W. Wallace and Karl Brekke
Table 1
Assumed Distribution of the Norwegian Part






















' The expected value is 4.95 million hectoliters.
Results
Table 1 shows our assumption of the distribution of the Norwegian
part of the quota in the summer capelin fishery. Furthermore, we let
the cost of labor be zero to reflect that alternative jobs do not exist
in rural Norway. Using the information above and well-established
data about the Norwegian purse seiner fleet, we get Tables 2 to 4.
In Table 2 we show the capacity of different fleet sizes, all mea-
sured in millions of hectoliters. Since we assume that quotas are
kept stable via trade, we shall naturally get a fleet that operates on
the margin of its capacity every year. Therefore, when we find a
fleet size in Table 3, we can immediately see from Table 2 what
amount that fleet will catch and thereby also how much we will
sell on average each year. The catch capacities in Table 2 corre-
spond to what we earlier called R.
Table 2
Catch Capacity and Average Amount of Quota Sold
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Table 3
Optimal Fleet Size for
Different Values of Selling Price



























° All vessels have cargo capacity
above 8000 hi.
Table 4
Average Value of Quotas Sold
(millions of Norwegian Kroner) for Different
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The fixed costs that enter the model are not the total fixed costs
for a vessel, but rather the part of it that on average must be
covered from this fishery. Since that value will vary with fleet size,
we had to calibrate the model. This was done when Tables 3 and 4
were created. The part of the fixed costs that is covered from other
fisheries was found by simulation on a model developed at Chr.
Michelsen Institute. A short description can be found in Hilstad
(1982).
In the upper left corner of Table 3 we see that with q'^ = q~ =0,
we will use only 43 vessels. (We solved the model with several vessel
groups, but ended up only with vessels with cargo capacity above
8000 hi.) This fleet structure is rather surprising, since it means that
with no quotas whatsoever (q~ = 0 means that any quota can be
bought at zero cost), we will only use 43 vessels and catch 4.7
million hectoliters of capelin. This is less than the average catch
today, and means that if the fishery was run by one firm, and that
the firm did not consider recruitment problems at all, it would only
catch 4.7 million hectoliters using 43 vessels. The forty-fourth vessel
would incur a net loss for the firm.
The results do not confirm with today's situation at all. There
are several reasons. First, we have used 7% rate of return (which
is commonly used in Norway) on all capital when calculating the
fixed costs of a vessel. Today, the rate is kept above zero only be-
cause of government subsidies. Second, we maximize profit for the
fleet as a whole, whereas the political goals today do not even re-
quire the fishing fleet to be in balance. Because of the externalities
there is, of course, a considerable diflerence even between profit
maximization and just balance.
In Tables 3 and 4 we have considered only situations where
q'^ <q~, except for the case q'^ = q' =0. The reason is, as we
mentioned earlier, that since we wish to buy national quotas when
total quotas are small and sell when total quotas are large, it is
reasonable to assume that the other countries will require some
compensation for absorbing all the variations.
As we move from the upper left corner of Table 3, we see how the
optimal fleet decreases as the buying price increases (the cost of
keeping the quota at a certain level goes up) or as the selling price
goes up (it becomes more profitable to sell the marginal reserves).Optimal Fleet Size When Quotas Can Be Traded 327
When it is no longer possible to buy quotas [q" = co) we get
an optimal fleet with 30 vessels. This is the number of vessels
necessary to catch the minimum possible quota 3,5 million
hectoliters.
Table 4 shows the expected value of traded quotas in connection
with the different solutions in Table 3. Note that we have an ex-
pected gain only when q~ = 6 and q'^ — A. We consider that com-
bination of trading prices rather improbable, however, since the
difference is so small (the compensation for absorbing all the risk
is low). Thus for all reasonable trading prices we will on average
sell quotas, but still have an expected economic loss due to the
difference between selling and buying prices. It is important to note,
however, that the other country will also gain from the fact that it
on average will catch more fish than today. (This is, of course, not
a general result.) The value of this gain will depend on the cost
structure of its fishing fleet.
It is worth noting that the fishmeal and fish-oil production from
the North Sea and the Barents Sea is not large enough to have any
major influence on the world market prices. Therefore, a year with
high quotas in the Barents Sea might easily be a year with high
prices on the world market. This is why we have assumed that the
value of 1 hi of capelin is independent of the quota.
There are different ways of reducing the ffeet size. To take part
in the capelin fisheries today, a vessel needs a license. The license
states the official cargo capacity of the vessel. Based on the cargo
capacity the vessel will be given a certain part of the total quota.
The formula used to calculate this portion is such that the value
of marginal capacity decreases rapidly with the size of the licensed
cargo capacity.
Today, there is a market for licenses. But if someone buys a
license, the cargo capacity attached to the new license is added to
the cargo capacity attached to the buyer's old license. Since, as
mentioned, the marginal value of capacity decreases rapidly with
the total cargo capacity, this extra capacity will be of little value
to the buyer. And even more important, it will be worth much less
for the seller. Clearly, in a market where the commodity is worth
much less for the buyer than for the seller, not much trading takes
place.328 Stein W. Wallace and Karl Brekke
Our suggestion is that the rules are changed so as to add not
licensed cargo capacities, but rather the resulting portions of the
total quota. Thereby the license gets the same value for both the
seller and the buyer. Hopefully, this will reduce the number of ves-
sels in the fisheries on a voluntary basis. It is also possible for the
government to buy back licenses. This can be a good investment
for the government since it will reduce the needs for subsidies.
Conclusions
The main conclusion of this article is that the number of vessels
should be reduced from 160 to between 40 and 50. The model also
suggests that only the largest vessels should be kept. The reason
is that the vessels spend most of their time transporting and not
fishing, and the large vessels are best suited for transportation.
We have also shown the rather surprising result that with no
restrictions on quotas in the summer capelin fishery, it is optimal
to use 43 vessels and catch 4.7 million hectoliters. This means that
with the current plant structure the forty-fourth vessel will incur
a net loss for the fleet even when allowed to catch as much as it
possibly can.
It is worth noting that this drastic cut in catch capacity will not
have any major effect on employment, since the remaining vessels
will need several crews instead of only one, as today. The reduc-
tion is therefore beneficial to everybody except the shipowner not
allowed to continue.
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